FINAL DRAFT

UNDP PROGRAMME SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE REFORM

IN LEBANON: AN OUTCOME EVALUATION

LEB/98/002 – Implementation of Institutional Development Strategy

LEB/92/017 – Fiscal Reform and Administration

LEB/01/001 – Assistance to Economic Policy

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List of Acronyms

ARLA	Assistance to the Reestablishment of the Lebanese Administration
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
EU	European Union
GoL	Government of Lebanon
IDU	Institutional Development Unit
IF	Institute of Finance
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ICT	Information Communication Technology
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOET	Ministry of Economy and Trade
MOF	Ministry of Finance
OMSAR	Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reforms
SHD	Sustainable Human Development
TCU	Technical Cooperation Unit
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WTO	World Trade Organisation
VAT	Value Added Tax

UNDP PROGRAMME SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE REFORM IN LEBANON: AN OUTCOME EVALUATION

1. Executive Summary

UNDP's programme of support to governance reform in Lebanon is rendered through three projects, which are located at the Ministry of Economy and Trade (MOET), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR).

The support provided by the programme falls into five main categories: (1) policy advice and legislative development; (2) institution and capacity building; (3) negotiation and consummation of trade agreements; (4) resource mobilisation and aid coordination; and (5) advocacy and partnerships.

1.1 Relevance

In all of these areas of operation the aims of the programme and its constituent projects are highly relevant and broad ranging, encompassing a large number and wide variety of crucial governance issues, such as: macroeconomic and fiscal policy; bilateral and multilateral trade agreements; the creation of a 'citizens' oriented administration'; the rationalisation of the size and cost of the administration, the modernisation of management systems throughout the administration, including ICT and e-government; consumer protection; intellectual property rights; small and medium sized business development; external and internal trade; the enhancement of economic competition; and the regulation of the insurance industry.

1.2 Effectiveness

In most of its substantive and non-substantive areas of operation the programme has been highly effective in providing support and implementing its activities. This is particularly true of MOF where there is clear evidence of effective project activity gathering momentum over the last decade in a number of clearly defined areas, such as customs, tax and land titles and cadastre. OMSAR has been particularly active and effective in the introduction of ICT across a wide range of government agencies, while MOET has effectively supported the publication of national accounts, the negotiation and signing of trade agreements, and the drafting of legislation necessary to support accession to the WTO (for example, international trade, competition, trade marks, antidumping, and so on).

In addition, all projects have been highly effective in resource mobilisation (signified by the large quantum of funds and variety of sources, and the continuity of support), aid coordination, advocacy and partnerships (signified by the very large number and variety of government and non-government partners).

In terms of institution and capacity building, skill transfer to clients outside of the host institution appears to have been effective and, in some cases, highly effective (MOF & OMSAR). However, the effectiveness of skill transfer within host institutions is more difficult to assess, and continuing dependency on project capacity seems likely.

1.3 Impact and Sustainability

In the case of MOF, where there has been continuity of project direction and activity over a relatively long period, there is evidence of considerable impact in terms of the quality and responsiveness of service delivery and consumer satisfaction (again, in customs, tax, land titles and cadastre). These service improvements are sustainable. Impact in the substantive areas of operation of MOET and OMSAR are more difficult to assess, partly because both projects (but particularly OMSAR) have undergone substantial, recent redesign; partly because the impact of policy and legislative change can take many years to materialise; and partly because one project (OMSAR) has no mandate to collect relevant data from its large number and variety of clients.

For very similar reasons to those just outlined, institution and capacity building impact (and therefore sustainability) in client institutions (outside of the host institution) is much more evident in MOF than it is in MOET or OMSAR. However, within the host institutions of all three projects there is relatively little evidence of skill transfer. In some cases the complexity and high cost of the skills involved makes this understandable; in others, it may be that out-sourcing to projects makes sense, at least in the short to medium terms. But, whatever the case, these are matters that deserve more explicit attention and reporting from project managers.

1.4 Lessons Learned

Programme and project success is attributable to:

a. **Legitimacy**, particularly in terms of: the strength and visibility of the support of the Minister; the extent of government 'ownership'; and the strength of the project's institutional location within government and the 'voice' accorded to the project as a result.

b. **Leadership and management** and its ability to create a strong project culture; transparent and fair systems of staff recruitment and selection, promotion and reward; and the skilful management of change and engagement with government.

c. **Character and quality of technical cooperation** in terms of problem and solution recognition and authenticity (meaning that significant others – government clients and citizens - recognise the importance of the problems addressed and the validity of the solutions proposed and implemented); and resulting outcome legitimacy and sustainability.

d. **Government and donor confidence**, which is dependent on the above but also on programme efficiency and effectiveness; and the quality of reporting and project transparency in general.

1.5 Recommendations

a. All projects should attend more self-consciously to all of the success factors outlined above. It is recognised that in some cases this is easier said than done because: first, institutional location is a given; second, many of the ingredients of success take considerable time and effort to implement – particularly in project management work programmes that are already crowded with operational activities; and third, the variability between projects in terms of their technical

attractiveness to outside clients in particular is often a function of whether the support carries with it ICT.

b. Taking into account the success factors listed above, consider conducting either an external or an internal mid-term review of the redesigned OMSAR project in order to:

    i. Examine the extent to which the project is operating in accordance with its new strategic direction.

    ii. Evaluate performance to date and, in particular, examine ways and costs of generating data on impact, skill transfer and sustainability. This could be considered for a representative sample of the numerous client organisations and more than 100 activities in which the project is engaged.

Expanding the compass of the newly instituted annual report may go some way to satisfying this suggestion, particularly by giving more explicit attention to the factors mentioned above. Nevertheless, the wide range and number of activities involved in this project suggest that this will not be an easy or cheap thing to do.

c. Taking into account the success factors listed above, consider conducting as soon as practicable either an external or an internal mid-term review of the redesigned MOET project in order to:

    i. Examine the extent to which the project is operating in accordance with its aims and objectives and project framework.

    ii. Evaluate performance to date and, in particular, provide data on impact, skill transfer and sustainability.

    iii. Consider the extent to which recommendations made in earlier reports have been implemented by the Ministry and, if not, reasons for this.

d. Encourage all projects to pay particular attention to, and to report on, skill transfer and capacity building.

2. Background and Purpose

This evaluation assesses the performance of UNDP-supported projects established in partnership with the Government of Lebanon (GoL) in the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR), and the Ministry of Economy and Trade (MOET). Viewed as a whole, these projects constitute UNDP's programme support to governance reform in Lebanon (the programme).

The technical assistance rendered by the programme to the GoL falls into the following (self-declared) broad performance categories: (1) the development of policy and supporting legislation, particularly in economic and fiscal matters; (2) institution and capacity building of the public sector; (3) the negotiation and consummation of bilateral, regional, and global trade agreements; (4) resource mobilisation and aid coordination; and (5) advocacy, and the establishment and management of partnerships with the private and public sectors and civil society.

It should be noted, however, that these categories might not capture all of the activities carried out by the three projects. One area, in which there is considerable activity, but which does not fit neatly into any of the above categories concerns what might be called 'marketing' of Lebanon through trade shows, seminars, conferences,

workshops, publications, and so on. In order not to overlook this work, below it is discussed under category 5, 'advocacy' etc.

Except for the OMSAR project, which does not engage in the 'negotiation of agreements', each of the projects under review operates in all of the above categories.

The projects and the programme as a whole are evaluated in terms of:

a. Their **relevance**: are the projects as relevant now to governance improvement and SHD as they were at their inception? Are they likely to remain so in the foreseeable future? What will their continuing relevance depend most upon?
b. Their **effectiveness**: have the projects provided worthwhile assistance in one or more of the areas mentioned above, that is, have they done as well as they could what they set out to do? This includes the capacity building effectiveness of the projects and the programme as a whole.
c. Their **impact**: what (positive) changes to governance in Lebanon can be attributed to project activities, or what visible, desirable results in terms of service delivery have the projects produced?
d. Their **sustainability:** first, are the host institutions capable of carrying out unaided the functions currently performed by the projects in their major areas of activity; and second, are the changes that have come about as a consequence of project activities self-sustaining?

3. Method

Each of the projects that constitute the programme has been subject to separate, recent, detailed internal and/or external evaluation (May 2001 to November 2003). (UNDP) Resource constraints required that these evaluation reports, together with written up-dates provided by the projects themselves, constituted the primary data for this evaluation. Where data are unavailable from these sources, or where data are of insufficient quality and/or quantity to support evaluative statements, comments to this effect are made in the report. The evaluator collected no new data in the field.

Analyses of secondary data and report writing were conducted over the period 16 July to 1 September 2004.

The evaluation criteria and the approach adopted in this study conform wherever possible to those outlined in the latest UNDP guidelines on the subject (see TOR, 2004). As mentioned above, the evaluation considers four criteria of project and programme performance: (1) relevance, (2) effectiveness, (3) impact, and (4) sustainability. With respect to each criterion, projects are evaluated as having attained one of four levels. For example, in relation to 'impact' projects are rated as having achieved 'negative', 'none', 'positive', or 'very positive' impact. For sustainability, the four levels are: 'dependency' (implying there has been little or no transfer of capacity to the host institution); 'developing' (implying that capacity transfer is in its early stages); 'positive' (implying that some capacity transfer has taken place); or 'very positive' (implying that capacity transfer is complete or almost complete).

All projects were given the opportunity to respond to a first draft of the report and to supply further relevant information, which was taken account of in the final draft.

4. Relevance

This part of the evaluation briefly describes what each project sets out to do in relation to one or more of the programme performance categories outlined above and then comments on the relevance of these aims. The relevance of each of the project's aims is evaluated first, followed by an evaluation of the programme as a whole.

4.1 Ministry of Economy and Trade

UNDP support to the Ministry of Economy and Trade (MOET) contributes to all five of the programme performance categories outlined above, as follows:

a. **Policy advice and legislative development:** in these respects, the project sets out to provide technical advice that impinges primarily on: consumer protection; the enhancement of economic competition; the regulation of the insurance industry; the promotion of external and internal trade; the protection of intellectual property; small and medium-sized enterprise development and the establishment of an enabling environment for such enterprises (including access to finance); and the strategic management of the Ministry as a whole. These aims remain **highly relevant** to governance improvement and sustainable economic and social development in Lebanon.

b. **Institution and capacity building:** the project aims to transfer technical skills to MOET staff in all of the areas described under (a) above. It also has an IT component that supports the modernisation of work procedures and the management of information within the Ministry. These aims remain **highly relevant.**

c. **Negotiation and consummation of trade agreements:** the project aims to provide support to the negotiation and consummation of global, regional and bilateral trade agreements. It also supports the establishment of 'trade information infrastructures and support services and networks'. These aims remain **highly relevant.**

d. **Resource mobilisation and aid coordination:** the project sets out to assist the Ministry with the coordination of external support provided to any of its areas of operation. It also undertakes to assist MOET with resource mobilisation as needs arise. These aims remain **highly relevant.**

e. **Advocacy and partnerships:** all save one of the areas mentioned under (a) above entail the development of partnerships and advocacy. The project sets out to assist with both of these activities, and these aims remain **highly relevant**.

Ministry of Finance

UNDP support to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) contributes to all five of the programme performance categories outlined above, as follows:

a. **Policy advice and legislative development:** in these respects, the project sets out to provide technical advice that impinges primarily on macroeconomic and fiscal policy: including the introduction of VAT, focus on large taxpayers, the deduction at source of salaries' tax, and the introduction of a general tax on income in lieu of the current schedule of income taxes; the devolution to local government of

revenue raising authority; the intergovernmental grant system; expenditure rationalisation; debt management; bilateral agreements on the promotion and protection of investments, and double taxation; and the strategic management of the Ministry as a whole. These aims remain **highly relevant** to governance improvement and to sustainable economic and social development in Lebanon.

b. **Institution and capacity building:** the project aims to transfer technical skills to MOF staff in all of the areas described under (a) above. These aims remain **highly relevant.**

c. **Negotiation and consummation of trade agreements:** the project aims to provide support to the negotiation and consummation of bilateral agreements on the promotion and protection of investments, and double taxation. These aims remain **highly relevant.**

d. **Resource mobilisation and aid coordination:** the project sets out to assist the Ministry with the coordination of external support provided to any of its areas of operation. It also undertakes to assist MOF with resource mobilisation as needs arise. These aims remain **highly relevant.**

e. **Advocacy and partnerships:** most of the areas mentioned under (a) above entail the development of partnerships and advocacy. The project sets out to assist the Ministry with both of these activities, and these aims remain **highly relevant**.

4.3 Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform

UNDP support to the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) contributes to four of the five programme performance categories outlined above, as follows:

a. **Policy advice and legislative development:** in these respects, the project sets out to provide technical advice that impinges primarily on the administrative reform of the civil service and the promotion of government effectiveness. These general aims are translated into four clearly defined national targets, namely: the creation of a 'citizens' oriented administration', the reduction of the size and cost of the administration, the establishment of modern management capacities in 'key administrations', and the 'modernisation of legislation'; 20 national outcomes; and 128 measurable activities. An important part of this work entails, first, the completion of a national strategy for administrative development, and second, devising an E-government strategy and associated plans of action for the government. The latter is based partly upon a continually up-dated 'situation map' of all ICT undertakings in government. The project also provides advice on the coordination of all technical assistance pertaining to administrative reform of the civil service. These aims remain **highly relevant** to sustainable economic and social development in Lebanon.

b. **Institution and capacity building:** the project pursues institution and capacity building objectives along two main avenues: institution development for the civil service as a whole, including supporting legislation, and second, it aims to transfer technical skills to OMSAR staff in all of the areas described under (a) above. These aims remain **highly relevant.**

c. **Resource mobilisation and aid coordination:** the project sets out to assist OMSAR with the management and coordination of external support provided to administrative reform throughout the civil service in Lebanon and in all of OMSAR's areas of operation. It also undertakes to assist MOF with the interpretation and application of procurement procedures, the preparation of terms of reference for ICT projects, and resource mobilisation as needs arise. These aims remain **highly relevant.**

d. **Advocacy and partnerships:** most of the areas mentioned under (a) above entail the development of partnerships and advocacy. The project sets out to assist OMSAR with both of these activities, and these aims remain **highly relevant**.

4.4 Programme as a Whole

It is clear from the above that the aims of the programme and its component projects address crucial areas of governance in Lebanon and therefore remain highly relevant to social and economic development in the country.

5. Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability

This part of the evaluation assesses whether the projects have been **effective**, that is, whether they have provided worthwhile assistance in their areas of operation - have they done as well as they could what they set out to do? In addition, this section attempts to make some assessment of **impact**: what (positive) changes to governance and service delivery in Lebanon can be attributed to project activities, or what visible, desirable results have the projects produced? and of **sustainability:** are the changes that have come about as a consequence of project activities self-sustaining, and are project functions and capacities being successfully transferred to host institutions? Here, special attention will be given to the capacity building effectiveness of the projects.

5.1 Ministry of Economy and Trade

The effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the project in its main areas of operation is assessed as follows:

a. **Policy advice and legislative development:** the project has made significant contributions to policy and legislative development in the following areas: consumer protection, the enhancement of economic competition, the regulation of the insurance industry, the promotion of external and internal trade, the protection of intellectual property, small and medium-sized enterprise development, and the strategic management of the Ministry as a whole. To date, its most significant contributions in these respects have been concerned with: (1) the overall conceptualisation of the role and functions of the Ministry in the modernisation of the Lebanese economy and its integration into the global economy; (2) strengthening of the institutional basis for an open, contestable market economy in Lebanon; (3) the development of economic and trade policy; (4) the promotion of exports and foreign direct investment; (5) modernising notions of consumer protection based on informed consumer choice and involvement of consumers in decision-making; (6) the creation of the conditions for the growth of robust small and medium sized enterprises and the reduced incidence of business failures; and

(7) the protection of intellectual property. The project has been **effective** in this domain, as demonstrated by the number of trade agreements that have been signed or are in the process of being negotiated (including WTO), the amount of significant relevant legislation that has been enacted, the regular production of national accounts, outreach activities (promotions, seminars, workshops), IT development and maintenance within the Ministry, and extensive groundwork for the establishment of an SME unit and public awareness campaigns on consumer protection and intellectual property. Questions of **impact** are more difficult to assess, as time lags between policy decisions, legislative enactment and tangible results can be considerable. **Sustainability** is also difficult to assess, as skill transfer in many of these areas is at an early stage. Understandably, relatively few data on these matters are supplied in the up-date report. Earlier reports (April and July 2002) on various aspects of the Ministry suggest relatively high levels of dependency on project capacity.

b. **Institution and capacity building:** as described in 5.1(a) above, the project's main contributions to date have entailed profound 're-invention' of MOET in nearly all of its areas of operation. Building the internal capacity to do the work involved will take a long time. For example, in relation to consumer protection, the existing workforce has an average age of over 50, and understands little about modern notions of the market or of consumer protection. As with other departments/divisions in the Ministry, organisational structures and management systems also require considerable revision. There is also a shortage of office equipment, transport, physical office space, technical testing equipment, and financial resources in consumer protection. Detailed proposals for the re-design of the consumer protection function of the Ministry were made in April 2002. However, there is no evidence available upon which to make judgements about whether the recommendations are in the process of being implemented or not. The same is true for the recommendations made in July 2002 concerning the reorganisation of the Ministry and the adoption of a new revised strategic management framework. Data are not available on skill transfer and capacity building. As indicated above, earlier reports suggest that there is much to do, and that (at least to July 2003) there were relatively high degrees of dependency in all areas of project operations. In this area, **effectiveness, impact** and **sustainability** are therefore difficult to assess, except that on the basis of earlier reports (to 2003), continuing high levels of dependency on project capacity seem likely, particularly in the more technically complex policy areas. This is understandable.

c. **Negotiation and consummation of agreements:** In November 2003, a second round of negotiations was held with EFTA countries (Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway) concerning: a free trade agreement (which was 'initialled'), an agriculture agreement (to be signed on a bilateral basis), and a services agreement under the WTO (which follows the EU Association Agreement model). In June 2003, a round of negotiations was held with Turkey (on a free trade agreement), and in the summer a trade agreement was signed with Vietnam. There was also considerable work undertaken during the course of 2003 towards Lebanon's accession to the WTO. Among other things, in 2004 there are plans to negotiate free trade agreements with Iran and other countries and to consummate the agreements for which negotiations commenced in 2003. On the basis of this, the project can be said to have been **highly effective** and to have achieved

reasonable impact. Hard data on skill transfer and capacity building are not yet available. **Sustainability** is therefore difficult to assess, except that on the basis of earlier reports (to 2003), continuing high levels of dependency on project capacity seem likely.

d. **Resource mobilisation and aid coordination:** In 2003, a Euro 15 million project was secured to support the establishment within the Ministry of a 'quality' unit for the purpose of 'strengthening quality management capabilities and infrastructure'. Also signed in 2003 was a financing agreement for 12 million € to support the implementation of the Association Agreement (Prime Minister's Office), and an agricultural development project valued at 10 million €. In 2004, there is the prospect of a Euro17 million project to support the development of small and medium sized enterprises. On the basis of this, the project can be said to have been **highly effective** and to have achieved **reasonable impact**. Hard data on skill transfer and capacity building are not yet available. **Sustainability** is therefore difficult to assess, except that on the basis of earlier reports (to 2003), continuing high levels of dependency on project capacity seem likely.

e. **Advocacy and partnerships:** The establishment of public-private partnerships and advocacy is the cornerstone of the 'in-corporate volunteerism programme'. This is a programme designed to encourage employees in Lebanese and foreign corporations in Lebanon to volunteer their labour in the support of the development of small and medium sized enterprises. This programme is in the early stages of its development. In addition, it is possible to infer from 5.1(c) & (d) above that the project has been active and effective in advocacy and partnerships in a number of other areas. Also, the project has engaged in a range of marketing activities – for the Ministry and for Lebanon – and activities preparatory to the building of partnerships, including: the publication of a weekly Internal Bulletin; a Lebanon-EU association agreement brochure; country reports on Iran and Turkey (for internal use); a brochure for Beirut International Airport; a brochure about MOET; and a website for the Ministry. On the basis of this, the project can be said to have been **effective** and to have achieved **some positive impact**. The project has been restructured in order give greater direction and significance to capacity building, but data on impact and sustainability are not yet available. **Sustainability** is therefore difficult to assess, except that on the basis of earlier reports (to 2003), continuing high levels of dependency on project capacity seem likely.

5.2 Ministry of Finance

The effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the project in its main areas of operation is assessed as follows:

a. **Policy advice and legislative development:** The programme has contributed significantly to the performance by the Ministry of its major responsibilities, particularly in terms of its crucial support to the formulation and implementation of the government's fiscal programme. It has also provided valuable support to the monitoring of public expenditure, the management of public debt and treasury operations, the financial management of public enterprises, and the establishment of annual national accounts. It is certain that without the support of the MOF programme the Ministry would not have been able to perform these functions as well as it has. The main service improvements for citizens, the private sector and

civil society have been realised in terms of: first, speeding-up the delivery of services provided by the MOF (for example, customs clearance, land titles and affidavits, salary payments, tax liabilities, and so on); second, increasing the validity, accuracy, and consistency of assessments and records (for example, customs duties, land/property boundaries and taxes, income taxes, land titles, and so on); third, increasing general levels of transparency and accountability in key areas of MOF operations; and, fourth, improving the availability and accessibility of valid, comprehensive and up-to-date financial, fiscal, and trade data. From the points of view of other government entities, in general terms, service improvements have also been realised in terms of: speed of service delivery; validity and reliability of decisions; transparency and accountability; and the range, quality, and accessibility of information. Automated links between MOF departments have also been established, resulting in better integration of activities and efficiency and effectiveness improvements. **Effectiveness** and **impact** in these areas has clearly been **considerable**. However, in relation to **sustainability**, the amount of transfer of these functions to the administration (indicated in parentheses above) has varied between them, but with relatively few exceptions has been **limited** – note: we refer here to the giving of policy advice; in the implementation of policy (e.g., customs, VAT, and cadastre) skill transfer and capacity building have been very good. Given the complex nature of some of these (policy advice) activities, this is understandable. However, in all cases the project has documented in detail the processes involved, sometimes in the form of user manuals.

b. **Institution and capacity building:** as noted above, when it comes to the provision of policy advice, thus far the project has not accomplished a great deal in the way of capacity building and skill transfer. The same is true in relation to the negotiation of agreements, resource mobilisation and advocacy. However, it is much more successful in these respects when it comes to the implementation of policy (and project management, development, and interface), particularly in relation to VAT (well advanced), customs (almost complete), land registration and cadastre (almost complete), and the Institute of Finance (complete). Overall, the project can therefore be said to have been **effective** and to have achieved **some impact**. Accordingly, in some areas of project operation sustainability is assured or very positive, in others dependent or developing. Nevertheless, a reasonable overall assessment of **sustainability would be tending towards positive**.

c. **Negotiation and consummation of agreements:** the project's (limited) role in this area is confined to: first, participation in negotiations concerning entry to EUROMED and the brokering of technical studies of the fiscal and economic implications of membership for Lebanon; and second, commenting on the implications of bilateral and multilateral agreements and their compatibility with the laws of Lebanon. The project argues the merits of different options. In terms of **effectiveness,** the Ministry reports **satisfactory** performance of these activities. The **impact** of these agreements **cannot yet be assessed**. However, skill transfer and capacity building (and therefore **sustainability**) in this area is **limited**.

d. **Resource mobilisation and aid coordination:** assistance has been obtained from a range of multilateral and bilateral agencies, including: CIDA, EU, IMF, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank, and the Governments of France and the

Netherlands. Exact data have not been provided, but the volume of such funding appears to be substantial and sustained. Resource mobilisation and coordination by the project therefore appear to be **highly effective** and to have resulted in **positive impact**. As for 5.2(c) above, **sustainability is limited** by relative inattention to skill transfer and capacity building.

e. **Advocacy and partnerships:** An important part of the project's role is to act as a two-way communication channel or 'bridge' between the Ministry and a wide range of donors, private contractors, trade partners, and customers. This is not just a passive role. The project exerts influence and negotiates on behalf, and at the direction, of the Ministry with, among others, international financial institutions, international economic and trade associations, international rating agencies, national governments, the business community, and members of the public. As we have seen in 5.2(d) above, a central feature of this role is resource mobilisation. The programme's record in this speaks for itself. Accordingly, in relation to advocacy and partnerships, the project appears to be highly **effective** and to have achieved **positive impact**. However, as for 5.2(d) above, **sustainability is limited** by relative inattention to skill transfer and capacity building.

5.3 Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform

The effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the project in its main areas of operation are addressed in detail in the project's annual report for 2003. This is a clearly structured and comprehensive document that addresses all aspects of the project's past, ongoing and planned performance – particularly since its redesign in 2002/2003. In part, this redesign responded to the findings of a detailed review conducted in May/June 2001, which suggested that the performance of the two main units involved – the Technical Cooperation Unit (TCU) and the Institutional Development Unit (IDU) – could be improved in a number of ways. Many of the recommendations for change arising from this review have since been implemented or are in the process of being implemented. The most recent performance data available to this review come from the 2003 annual report mentioned above.

The 2001 report found that the TCU "has not accomplished most of the objectives originally set out for it and has developed a core line of business, if not unforeseen in the original project documents, not given much priority therein... The success of this new line of business, in terms of tangible improvements to the quality of service delivery and responsiveness on the part of those parts of the civil service that have received support from the TCU, is difficult to assess, but seems limited.... The IDU, on the other hand, has done many of the things that it was originally intended to do, mainly in the way of the production of plans and reviews, but relatively little *implementation* has taken place. Its *tangible* impact on administrative reform of the civil service has been negligible.... We can deduce from the above that OMSAR's effectiveness to date as an agent of genuine administrative reform has been very limited.... In our view, the impact of project activities on government performance has been negligible. We interpret 'government performance' to mean the quality, cost and timeliness of the services it delivers to the public. We have no survey evidence from citizens, or other empirical data, to support this, but there is widespread agreement among project staff that this is a fair assessment... It follows from the above that project activities have not contributed greatly to OMSAR's standing as an agent for the substantive reform of the civil service... Whether any of the above activities are

sustainable in the sense that the skills have been, or are being, transferred to non-government staff or government counterpart agencies is (not) clear. We suspect that more could be done in this vital area" (pp. 27-31).

These findings are included here more for historical interest than anything else. A new project document was reviewed and approved by the Council of Ministers in January 2003. This will take the project through to mid-2006. As mentioned above, the 2003 annual report provides a comprehensive account of the project's performance – from its inception in 1994 to date – and is the basis for the conclusions drawn below.

a. **Policy advice and legislative development.** There has been considerable accomplishment in this area, in terms of studies initiated, policy proposals made, and policy decisions taken, concerning:

   i. The creation of a **'citizens' oriented administration'**, including: the simplification of procedures in order to improve the effectiveness and timeliness of services delivered to the public in a range of ministries and government agencies; national ICT and E-government policy development and implementation; impact based performance assessment; civil service transparency and responsiveness; and public awareness raising and communication.

   ii. **Reducing the size and cost of the administration**, including: the consolidation and analysis of existing data on the size of the administration; data accessibility for executive-level decision-makers; reducing the cost of the administration through privatisation, the standardisation of procurement procedures, and so on; and the review and reform of the functions of control agencies.

   iii. **The establishment of modern management capacities in key parts of the administration**, including: overall strategic management of the civil service; the establishment of electronic human resource databases, including information on attendance; a modern job classification system; performance management, recruitment and selection, and promotion and motivation; capacity building; automation; and results-oriented administration.

   iv. **The modernisation of the legal framework**, including: the structures and mandates of ministries; decentralisation and deconcentration; automated data collection, analysis, and access; deregulation and the simplification of legalese.

Although many areas of activity are at an early stage of development, the project can be said to have been **highly effective** in the above areas, particularly in the year or so since its redesign. Assessing **impact** and **sustainability** is more problematic because the project does not have a mandate to gather relevant pre and post-intervention data and because of the varying (mostly early) stages of development of project activities in the areas mentioned.

b. **Institution and capacity building.** It can be inferred from the annual report that all of the areas of project activity described under 5(a) above entail significant capacity building – of OMSAR and of the various government agencies involved. Such capacity building has taken, or will take, a wide variety of forms, including: simplification of procedures, organisational redesign, process automation, training in a wide variety of technical fields, website creation, and so on. For example, under the ARLA, the project will soon commence major capacity building initiatives for local government that focus on the (community) planning and solid waste management capabilities of municipalities. Where project activities have been successfully completed, it can be inferred that the project has been **effective.** As for 5.3(a) above, assessing **impact** and **sustainability** is more problematic because the project does not have a mandate to gather relevant pre and post-intervention data and because of the varying (mostly early) stages of development of project activities in the areas mentioned or, where project activities have been completed, the relatively early stage of implementation.

c. **Resource mobilisation and aid coordination.** The project has been **highly effective** in this domain, and has mobilised more than USD$80 million, mainly from the European Union (38 million Euros), the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development (USD$20 million), the World Bank (USD$20 million), and UNDP (USD$2.5 million). As for 5.3(a) and (b) above, assessing **impact** is difficult for largely the same reasons. It is not clear from the available reports how much capacity building of, and skill transfer to, OMSAR staff has taken place in this domain, so the **sustainability** of this function in OMSAR is difficult to ascertain. Dependency on project capacity seems likely however.

d. **Advocacy and partnerships.** The wide range of activities initiated by the project – as set out in detail in the 2003 Annual Report and summarised in 5.3(a) above – are highly suggestive of successful advocacy in relation to a large number and variety of government partners and public institutions, including: the Ministries of Finance, Justice, Public Health, Displaced, Labour, Education, Environment, Culture, Social Affairs, Economy and Trade, Foreign Affairs, Youth and Sports, Energy and Hydraulics, Tourism, and Industry, the Central Office for Administrative Information, the Council of State, the Civil Service Council, the Central Administration of Statistics, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the water Authorities of Beirut and Barouk, the Directorate General of Urban Planning, the Directorate General of Customs, the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon, the Civil Service Board, the Court of Civil Accounts, various municipalities, the Litani River Authority, the National Employment Office, the Cooperative of Government Employees, the national Council for Scientific Research, the National Centre for Remote Sensing, the Economic and Social Council, the National Archives, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Directorate General of Land and maritime Transport, the Directorate of Research and Guidance of the Central Inspection, the Court of Audit, the Central Inspection, the Council for Development and Reconstruction, the National Social Security Fund, the Authority of Electricity, and so on. This is an impressive list of clients and partners and the project has clearly been **highly effective** in this domain. As for 5.3(a), (b) and (c) above, assessing **impact** is difficult for largely the same reasons. Neither is it clear from the available reports how much capacity building of, and skill transfer to,

OMSAR staff has taken place in this domain, so the **sustainability** of this function in OMSAR is difficult to ascertain. Dependency on project capacity seems likely however. It is possible in any case that - at least in the short to medium terms - this is a function that is best out-sourced to projects. However, planning and action for skill transfer and sustainability should still receive attention.

5.4 Programme as a Whole

Table 1 below contains a summary of project and programme performance according to relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

It is clear from Table 1 and discussion above that programme and project aims and activities remain highly relevant to UNDP's support to governance reform as a means to equitable and sustainable human development (SHD) in Lebanon. It is also fair to say that all three of the projects are highly effective in that they manage to do well the things they are meant to do in all of the main categories of operation, namely: 'policy advice and legislative development', 'institution and capacity building', 'resource mobilisation and aid coordination', and 'advocacy and partnerships'. The range of issues addressed by the projects and number and diversity of government and public clients are impressive.

However, as one might expect, Table 1 and discussion above also suggest that in terms of impact and sustainability, there is some variability between the different projects that comprise the programme. But the discussion also suggests that these areas are more difficult to assess, for reasons that include the following:

a. Time lags between policy decisions, legislative enactment and tangible results – or impact - can be considerable.

b. Allied to (a) above is the fact that most project activities are in an early stage of development (particularly for OMSAR, since its redesign) or, where project activities have been completed, they are in a relatively early stage of implementation.

c. One project (OMSAR) does not have a mandate to gather relevant pre and post-intervention data, and its activities are spread over a very large number and variety of clients, thereby making such assessment extremely complex costly.

d. In terms of skill transfer and sustainability to project host institutions and/or to other recipients, some of the more technically complex areas are clearly more difficult to transfer, for intrinsic reasons but also partly because the skills involved may be beyond the purchasing power of government and partly because (at least in the short term) some activities (e.g., resource mobilisation) are best outsourced to projects. Nevertheless, all three projects could give more explicit attention to this domain in their activities and in their reporting.

As suggested immediately above, skill transfer and sustainability need to be addressed more explicitly by all three projects. The variability in project performance in these important respects cannot be attributed to the complexity of the skills in question alone, as MOF scores satisfactorily in this domain despite having arguably the most complex overall skills set to transfer. These are matters that would benefit from more

direct and sustained attention from project managers, even if only to argue more explicitly the issues surrounding such skill transfer and, in some cases, possibly TO QUESTION its rationality from the point of view of government.

Table 1: Summary of Project and Programme Performance					
Project	**Relevance** (Score: 1-4) Irrelevant; somewhat relevant; relevant; & highly relevant	**Effectiveness:** (Score: 1-4) Ineffective; somewhat effective; effective; highly effective	**Impact:** (Score: 1-4) Negative; none; positive; very positive	**Sustainability:** (Score: 1-4) Dependent; developing; positive; very positive	**Observations**
1. MOET					
Policy & legislative development	Highly relevant (4)	Effective (3)	Difficult to assess, but probably positive (3)	Dependent (1)	Except in one or two areas of activity, impact is difficult to assess. Reports to the Minister take the form of a long list of bullet points from which it is difficult to infer impact. No new data have been supplied on sustainability. Earlier reports suggest continuing 'dependency'. This is to be expected in such technically complex areas.
Capacity building	Highly relevant (4)	Hard data not yet available because of early stages of reorganisation (2)	Hard data not yet available because of early stages of reorganisation (2)	Hard data not yet available because of early stages of reorganisation, but probably dependent (1)	The project has been restructured, partly in order to give greater significance to this area of activity
Negotiation of agreements	Highly relevant (4)	Highly effective (4)	Difficult to assess, but probably positive (3)	Dependent (1)	This area has the most clearly discernible impact. However, as for 'policy', on sustainability are not yet available. Earlier reports suggest continuing 'dependency'.
Resource mobilisation & aid coordination	Highly relevant (4)	Highly effective (4)	Aid coordination difficult to assess. Resource mobilisation very positive (4)	Dependent (1)	Project support has recently been obtained, or is in prospect, to a total of Euro 54 million (2003 & 2004).
Advocacy & partnership establishment	Highly relevant (4)	Effective (3)	Difficult to assess because of early stage of development, but probably positive (3)	Dependent (1)	Relatively little data available on impact – good initiatives regarding SMEs; inferences drawn from other activities.
MOET totals	**20/20**	**16/20**	**1520**	**4/20**	**55/80 (69%)**
2. MOF					
Policy & legislative development	Highly relevant (4)	Highly effective (4)	Very positive (4)	Developing (2)	The project has been highly successful in the development & implementation of

Table 1: Summary of Project and Programme Performance

Project	Relevance (Score: 1-4) Irrelevant; somewhat relevant; relevant; & highly relevant	Effectiveness: (Score: 1-4) Ineffective; somewhat effective; effective; highly effective	Impact: (Score: 1-4) Negative; none; positive; very positive	Sustainability: (Score: 1-4) Dependent; developing; positive; very positive	Observations
					policy in a number of areas such as VAT & Customs. Further work needs to be done in relation to capacity building for sustainability, although this will not be straightforward.
Capacity building	Highly relevant (4)	Effective (3)	Positive (3)	Developing to positive (3)	Except for policy development, resource mobilisation, advocacy, & negotiation of agreements, this area of performance is very good. The latter is particularly so for project implementation, management & development.
Negotiation of agreements	Highly relevant (4)	Highly effective (4)	Too early to assess, but likely to be very positive (4)	Developing (2)	This is not a major area of activity for the project.
Resource mobilisation & aid coordination	Highly relevant (4)	Highly effective (4)	Very positive (4)	Dependent (1)	The project is widely regarded by stakeholders as an exemplar of good technical assistance, & there is a very high degree of government ownership & advocacy of the project.
Advocacy & partnership establishment	Highly relevant (4)	Highly effective (4)	Very positive (4)	Developing (2)	As above.
MOF totals	**20/20**	**20/20**	**19/20**	**10/20**	**69/80 (86%)**
3. OMSAR					
Policy & legislative development	Highly relevant (4)	Highly effective (4)	No mandate to collect relevant data, but positive effects likely (3)	Not clear from the available reports how much capacity building of, and skill transfer to, OMSAR staff has taken place, but likely to be dependent (1)	The current review has considerable recent data of high quality in relation to effectiveness, but impact is more difficult to assess because the project does not have a mandate to collect relevant data.
Capacity building	Highly relevant (4)	Difficult to assess, but where project activities have been successfully concluded, can infer that capacity building has been effective (3)	Mandate prevents collection of relevant data, but where activities successfully completed likely to be positive (3)	Most project activities at too early a stage of development for accurate assessment (2)	As above, but this is an area where project performance reports could probably be a little more expansive and explicit throughout
Negotiation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 1: Summary of Project and Programme Performance

Project	Relevance (Score: 1-4) Irrelevant; somewhat relevant; relevant; & highly relevant	Effectiveness: (Score: 1-4) Ineffective; somewhat effective; effective; highly effective	Impact: (Score: 1-4) Negative; none; positive; very positive	Sustainability: (Score: 1-4) Dependent; developing; positive; very positive	Observations
of agreements					
Resource mobilisation & aid coordination	Highly relevant (4)	Highly effective (4)	Mandate prevents collection of relevant data, but where activities successfully completed likely to be positive (3)	Not clear from the available reports how much capacity building of, and skill transfer to, OMSAR staff has taken place, but likely to be dependent (1)	The project is clearly highly successful in this domain. Sustainability may not be an issue, as the 'out-sourcing' of this activity (to the project) may make most sense from government's point of view, at least in the short term
Advocacy & partnership establishment	Highly relevant (4)	Highly effective (4)	As above	As above	As above
OMSAR totals	**16/16**	**15/16**	**12/16**	**5/16**	**48/64 (75%)**
4. Programme as a whole					
Policy & legislative development	Highly relevant	MOET: Effective MOF: Highly effective OMSAR: Highly effective	MOET: Difficult to assess, but probably positive MOF: Very positive OMSAR: No mandate to collect relevant data	MOET: Dependent MOF: Developing OMSAR: No mandate to collect relevant data	In terms of effectiveness, impact and sustainability, there is some variability between the different projects that comprise the programme. For OMSAR and MOET, no suitable data are available to support judgements in a number of areas of project performance.
Capacity building	Highly relevant	MOET: Hard data not yet available because of early stages of reorganisation MOF: Effective OMSAR: Difficult to assess, but where project activities have been successfully concluded, can infer that capacity building has been effective	MOET: Hard data not yet available because of early stages of reorganisation MOF: Positive OMSAR: Mandate prevents collection of relevant data, but where activities successfully completed likely to be positive	MOET: Hard data not yet available because of early stages of reorganisation MOF: Developing to positive OMSAR: Most project activities at too early a stage of development for accurate assessment	As above, but this is an area where project Performance reports could probably be a little more expansive and explicit throughout
Negotiation of agreements	Highly relevant	MOET: Effective MOF: Highly effective OMSAR: N/A	MOET: Difficult to assess, but probably positive MOF: To early to assess, but likely to be	MOET: Dependent MOF: Developing OMSAR: N/A	As above.

Table 1: Summary of Project and Programme Performance					
Project	**Relevance** (Score: 1-4) Irrelevant; somewhat relevant; relevant; & highly relevant	**Effectiveness:** (Score: 1-4) Ineffective; somewhat effective; effective; highly effective	**Impact:** (Score: 1-4) Negative; none; positive; very positive	**Sustainability:** (Score: 1-4) Dependent; developing; positive; very positive	**Observations**
			very positive OMSAR: N/A		
Resource mobilisation & aid coordination	Highly relevant	MOET: Effective MOF: Highly effective OMSAR: Highly effective	MOET: Aid coordination difficult to assess. Resource mobilisation probably positive MOF: Very positive OMSAR: Mandate prevents collection of relevant data, but where activities successfully completed likely to be positive (3)	MOET: Dependent MOF: Dependent OMSAR: Not clear from the available reports how much capacity building of, and skill transfer to, OMSAR staff has taken place, but likely to be dependent	As above.
Advocacy & partnership establishment	Highly relevant	MOET: Somewhat effective MOF: Highly effective OMSAR: Highly effective	MOET: Difficult to assess, but probably positive MOF: Very positive OMSAR: As above	MOET: Dependent MOF: Developing OMSAR: As above	As above.

6. Reasons for Success or Failure, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned

This section of the report considers possible explanations for the success or failure (performance) of the programme and its projects, and for lack of data. It also considers lessons learned for the structure and design of governance reform programmes or portfolios in Lebanon, and makes a small number of recommendations.

6.1 Explanations of Performance

Our discussion to this point clearly suggests that the most successful project within the programme is MOF. Following the recent study of MOF, "We interpret 'success' to mean favourable impressions that are formed on the basis of tangible and visible programme accomplishments, rather than a detailed knowledge of the technical outcomes of programme activities or the activities themselves. We describe this type of success as 'political success'. Its confident and frequent expression by government (which implies political will) is a necessary condition for its expression by other interested parties, particularly donors. Political success ensures a continuing supply of resources, which strengthens the programme, and creates a 'virtuous circle' (MOF, 2003, p. 6).

A recent review of that project explained its success as follows: "The success of the programme is explained, first, by its legitimacy, which stems from the personal support of the Minister, government ownership, institutional location (at the MOF), the quality and commitment of staff, its performance track record, the volume and diversity of technical and financial support that it receives, and its corporate image; second, by the high quality of programme leadership and management; third, by the quality and character of technical cooperation, measured in terms of the widespread recognition of the importance and authenticity of the programme's work and the significance of its multifaceted role; and fourth, by government and donor confidence, which is based on the foregoing, and which results in strategic partnerships based on mutual confidence and trust, delegation to the programme of considerable authority and responsibility, programme operational autonomy and flexibility, and continuing support" (MOF, 2003, p.6). Given the recency of this evaluation, we would expect these explanations of success to remain valid.

A particularly important element of this explanation concerns the project's performance track record and the tangible results that constitute it. Again, the recent evaluation report states the position clearly: "Tangible programme results are most evident in service improvements to citizens, the private sector and civil society and to other government entities. In particular, transaction costs at Customs, and at Land Registration and Cadastre have been drastically reduced. In addition, modernisation based on work process simplification, automation, and training have transformed the character of service delivery by the Ministry and public perceptions of it – even in notoriously difficult areas such as taxation (VAT).

While not yet as tangible or clear as they are in the above areas, positive results are also discernible in the Ministry's other major areas of responsibility, namely: policy formulation and implementation, and public financial management" (MOF, 2003, p. 6).

We expect that these ingredients of success would be relevant to the other projects in the programme (MOET & OMSAR).

In the case of OMSAR, a lack of suitable recent data makes it difficult to offer any explanations for performance. We can say, however, that the project has been undergoing a prolonged period of strategic re-positioning and organisational change, which have only relatively recently been crystallised in a new project document. This will have affected its ability to produce tangible project results, but in the absence of relevant data it is difficult to say this with any certainty. Nevertheless, the OMSAR 2003 Annual Report catalogues an extremely impressive range of important interventions across a wide variety and large number of government entities and public institutions. This project also scores particularly well on resource mobilisation and advocacy (as demonstrated by its lengthy and diverse client portfolio). This suggests that certain features of the project are particularly attractive to customers. We suspect that it is largely the ICT components of the project that act as its cutting edge and facilitate entry.

In the case of MOET, there is also a lack of suitable data. From the information supplied, there is considerable activity, but relatively little evidence on impact and on sustainability.

For the project as a whole (even in some areas of MOF performance), one area that deserves much closer attention is that of skill transfer and capacity building. Some areas of skill transfer are clearly more difficult than others – such as policy advice – and we would expect that all projects experience similar problems here. Again, the recent review of MOF is instructive on this topic: "As we have seen, to date the programme has on the whole addressed issues surrounding the transfer of skills and sustainability very well. Nevertheless, there are one or two areas where there may be some room for improvement. First, dependency on the programme by the Ministry for certain operational tasks – some of which are relatively routine – might benefit from more formal management attention. This could be done by recording instances of it and determining means and schedules for transfer.

Second, the programme and the Ministry should agree in broad terms about the form that transfer to the Ministry of the policy advice role will take, and an approximate schedule for this could be worked out. As we have seen, this 'policy advice' role is the most complex function undertaken by the programme – both technically (in terms of the subject matter) and organisationally (in terms of the sources and forms of policy advice). It is not certain that such a role should or could be transferred in its entirety to the Ministry *per se*, that is, so that it becomes a conventional part of the administration. 'Should' because the 'goose' that currently 'lays the golden eggs' may be unable to do so quite so well in a more confined 'space', one that is restricted mainly in terms of its ability to make use of the best talent available on the local market and, in some cases, the international market. 'Could' because without the ability to pay at least market rates, it will be difficult to attract the quality of staff required for such work. Putting in place the structural arrangements and defining the role and staffing of an MOF entity to do some of this 'policy advice' work will be less than straightforward.

It may be that some variant of the present arrangement – whereby such advice is provided and/or brokered in large part by a structural appendage to the Ministry – will offer the most feasible and effective option. But such structural options will need to be carefully considered and thought through. Greater emphasis could probably be given to this task" (MOF, 2003, p. 37).

However, it also seems likely that other – more straightforward – areas of project skill transfer and capacity building may not be receiving the attention they deserve, or they are not being reported as comprehensively as they could (and should) be. This aspect of project performance requires careful study, particularly in MOET and OMSAR. This is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

6.2 Lessons Learned

The MOF project in particular, but aspects of both of the other projects as well, provide clear lessons for project success (see above and MOF 2003). These include:

a. **Legitimacy** in terms of: the strength and visibility of the support of the Minister; the extent of government 'ownership'; the strength of the project's institutional location within government and the 'voice' accorded to the project as a result; the quality and commitment of project staff; the performance track record of the project and the extent to which this is known in the 'industry'; the sources and

volume of financial support; and the corporate image of the project and its host institution.

b. **Leadership and management** and its ability to create a strong project culture; transparent and fair staff recruitment and selection, promotion and reward; and the skilful management of change and engagement with government.

c. **Character and quality of technical cooperation** in terms of problem and solution recognition and authenticity (meaning that significant others recognise the importance of the problems addressed and the validity of the solutions proposed and implemented); and resulting outcome legitimacy and sustainability.

d. **Government and donor confidence**, which is dependent on the above but also on programme efficiency and effectiveness; and the quality of reporting and project transparency in general. The OMSAR 2003 Annual Report is an excellent example of what can be done in relation to the quality of project reporting.

6.3 Recommendations

The project as a whole is trying to do the right things, and doing them effectively but, for a number of reasons set out above, levels of impact, skill transfer to host institutions and sustainability are low and/or difficult to ascertain. Accordingly, the main recommendations arising from this evaluation are as follows:

a. All projects should attend more self-consciously to all of the success factors identified under Section 6.2 above. It is recognised that in some cases this is easier said than done because, first, institutional location is a given; and second, many of the ingredients of success take considerable time and effort to implement – particularly in project management work programmes that are already crowded with operational activities.

b. Taking into account the success factors listed in 6.2 above, consider conducting as soon as practicable either an external or an internal mid-term review of the redesigned OMSAR project in order to:
   i. Examine the extent to which the project is operating in accordance with its new strategic direction.
   ii. Evaluate performance to date and, in particular, examine ways and costs of generating data on impact, skill transfer and sustainability. This could be considered for a representative sample of the numerous client organisation and more than 100 activities in which the project is engaged.

Expanding the compass of the newly instituted annual report may go some way towards satisfying this suggestion, particularly by giving more explicit attention to the factors mentioned above. Nevertheless, the wide range and number of activities involved in this project suggest that this will not be an easy or cheap thing to do.

c. Taking into account the success factors listed in 6.2 above, consider conducting as soon as practicable either an external or an internal mid-term review of the redesigned MOET project in order to:
   iii. Examine the extent to which the project is operating in accordance with its aims and objectives and project framework.

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    iv. Evaluate performance to date and, in particular, provide data on impact, skill transfer and sustainability.

    v. Consider the extent to which recommendations made in earlier reports have been implemented by the Ministry and, if not, reasons for this.

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d. Encourage all projects to pay particular attention to, and to report on, skill transfer and capacity building.

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